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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Trenton Lee Maki appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the

ﬁnding him guilty 0f trafﬁcking

trial

verdict

in heroin.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

The following facts were established during Maki’s jury trial. On January
Drax Delﬁco (of Probation and Parolel) conducted a
Maki’s wife, Tabatha, her

L21.) From numerous past
and aware

that

,

Visit t0

10,

2019, Ofﬁcer

Maki’s Meridian residence Where

and her mother lived.

(6/1 1/19 Tn, p.198, L.8

— p.200,

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco was familiar with the layout 0f the residence

Visits,

Maki and Tabatha shared

a bedroom.

(6/11/19 Tn, p.200, Ls.4-16; p.246, L.20

—

p.247, L9.)

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco was allowed inside by Tabatha’s mother, and as he walked through the
house, he saw

Maki

sleeping With Tabatha’s son in the son’s bedroom, so he continued

hallway to Tabatha and Maki’s bedroom door and knocked on

L24.)

bedroom

1

(6/1 1/19 Tr., p.201, L.6

Getting n0 answer, Ofﬁcer Delﬁco kept knocking and said, “Probation

Tabatha, are you awake?” (6/1 1/19

room.

it.

door, so he

opened

it

to

Tr.,

p.203, Ls.2-3.)

ﬁnd Tabatha

(6/1 1/19 Tr., p.203, Ls. 4-8.)

One

down the

The ofﬁcer noticed

light

&

[sic]

— p.202,
Parole.

from under the

sleeping 0n the bed, and a lot 0f syringes in the

syringe 0n the corner of the bed, and another

In accordance With a pre-trial ruling, the state attempted t0 keep the jury

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco was a “Probation and Parole” ofﬁcer.

(E 6/11/19

Tr.,

was on

unaware 0f the
p.34, L.1

—

the

fact that

p.35, L.1.)

However, that information was inadvertently divulged to the jury by the ofﬁcer’s testimony that
When he knocked 0n the bedroom door, the ofﬁcer said, “Probation & [sic] Parole. Tabatha, are
you awake?” (6/11/19 Tr., p.203, Ls.2-3.) Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial
based on that miscue. (6/11/19

Tr.,

p.219, L.9

— p.221, L5.)

ﬂoor “loaded” with a “black

tar—like substance,”

ofﬁcer believed t0 be heroin. (6/1 1/19

Tr.,

which, based on his training and experience, the

The ofﬁcer

p.203, Ls.8-13.)

later clariﬁed that

when

he ﬁrst opened the door, he immediately noticed multiple syringes “strewn about the room and
least

two loaded with a dark

next t0 Tabatha.

(6/11/19

Delﬁco called dispatch
While waiting

tar—like substance”

p.208, L.10

Tr.,

and

lethargic,

him

in the hallway.

in handcuffs,

that

woke Tabatha

t0 realize

(6/1 1/19 Tn, p.217, Ls.17-21.)

sitting in the hallway.

(6/11/19

Tr.,

Maki

if he

wanted

told

when he

(6/11/19 Tn, p.213, L.4

pictures of her purse

L.5.) Inside the

sit

T11, p.

t0 talk,

— p.250,

home.

is

216, Ls.5-22.) The ofﬁcer told

mine.

Maki

he could wait for Deputy Daigle to

arrived at the scene, Ofﬁcer

re-entered the residence,

p.249, L.16

— p.216,

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco, “Everything

When Deputy Daigle

residence, and he also took photos While inside the

— p.271,

had her

Noticing that Maki was very sluggish

Delﬁco

Maki and Tabatha were

L.10.)

Deputy Daigle’s on-body Video camera was activated the

p.270, L.24

Ofﬁcer

(6/11/19 Tn, p.210,

up, placed her in handcuffs, and

mine. That’s What I’m going t0 say.” (6/1 1/19

stepped outside to speak With him, and

still

that point,

what was happening, the ofﬁcer concluded, based 0n

sat in the hallway,

he did not have t0 say anything, and

arrive.

in the hallway.

sit

Maki was going through drug Withdrawal.

L3.) While Maki and his Wife
It’s all

and had him

(6/1 1/19 Tn, p.211, Ls.9-15.)

and did not appear

his experience, that

At

which lay

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco entered the two-year—old’s bedroom and

for assistance,

L.18 — p.21 1, L.15.) The ofﬁcer then

Maki

p.209, L.2; p.228, Ls.6-21.)

to a purse

to request ofﬁcer assistance. (6/1 1/19 TL, p.203, Ls.13-15.)

restrained Maki, placing

next to

—

which were on the bed, next

at

entire time

he was Maki’s

(6/1 1/19 Tr., p.262, L. 14

bedroom Where Tabatha had been

— p.265, L.24;

sleeping, the deputy took

and various contents, including a “baggie 0f heroin,” an empty syringe, a

“broken syringe showing blood,” and a “syringe loaded With heroin.” (6/1 1/19

Tr.,

p.275, Ls. 12-

16;

ﬂ

generally

digital scale,

id.,

p.275, L.6

— p.277,

With brown residue 0n

it,

L.17;

St.

sitting

Exs. 3a, 3b, 3c, 4.) Deputy Daigle also found a

on the bed next

to the purse.

(6/11/19

Tr.,

p.277,

L.23 — p.278, L.5.
In a nightstand drawer in

name 0n

Tabatha’s

it,

Maki and Tabatha’s bedroom was

Which contained two

had been turned inside

and another

that

7a, 7b, 7c.)

In the area in front of a

plastic baggies

— one With “suspected heroin”

(6/11/19 Tn, p.278, L.22

out.

bedroom

dresser,

a prescription bottle with

— p.280, L.12;

Deputy Daigle found a

ﬂ

inside,

Exs.

St.

knit cap containing

a wallet With Maki’s identifying information that held a small baggie of syringes, a couple of small
baggies, and a black plastic jar Which emitted an odor consistent With the odor of heroin. (6/ 1 1/ 1 9

Tn, p.293, L.14

— p.297,

L.8;

ﬂ

St.

EXS. 13a through 136.) While the baggies of suspected heroin

and most of the syringes (including the “loaded” ones) were
t0

laid out

0n the bed, and

Deputy Daigle’s question 0f Whose items he had found, Maki said

found, and would ﬁnd,

would be

suspected heroin at the time.

had blood
8.)

Maki

in

it

his,

(6/11/19

and he appeared
T11,

Maki

and he had loaded the other syringe the previous

told the deputy that

p.322, L.17

that the baggies

deputy
of the

said that one 0f the syringes

night.

had turned one 0f the baggies found
Tr.,

that the item the

be nodding

p.321, Ls.18—25.)

out in order t0 get everything out of it. (6/11/19

that

to

in response

(6/1 1/19 Tn, p.322, Ls.6-

in the prescription bottle inside

— p.323,

L.12.)

Maki explained

he hides things in his wallet and the purse because Tabatha’s mother would not look in her

belongings. (6/1 1/19 Tn, p.323, L.18
get a lot more,

-

p.324, L.2.)

which the deputy understood

Maki conﬁded

submitted the two baggies 0f suspected heroin

—

to the

he knew where he could

as referring t0 heroin. (6/1 1/19 Tr., p.325, Ls. 12-22.)

Deputy Daigle took photos of all the evidence items

the prescription bottle

that

seized, placed

— one baggie from

county laboratory for

testing.

them

into property,

the purse, and one baggie

(6/11/19 Tn, p.297, L.25

and

from

— p.298,

L24;

p.310, L.24

—

p.312, L.12; p.355, Ls.14-17 (deputy agreeing that the only baggies with

suspected heroin were the ones “in the purse and the

scientist

with the

Ada County

(State’s Exhibit 20),

0.10 grams.

The

Sheriff’s Ofﬁce, testiﬁed that she

state

charged Maki in an Information with trafﬁcking in heroin (two 0r more grams)

Maki

counts.

(R., pp.72, 106;

is

6/12/19

Tr.,

ofdrug paraphernalia.
8-120.)

(R., pp.30-31),

followed by Part

II

a persistent Violator of law (R., pp.35-36). The jury found

Tn, p139, Ls.1-15.)

p.141, L.7

sentence With three years

1 1

examined those two baggies

(E generally 6/12/19 Tn, p.15, L.15 — p.26, L.19.)

alleging

(R., pp.

Kayla Brown, a forensic

and they both contained heroin — baggie #1 held 4.5 grams and baggie #2 held

and possession of drug paraphernalia

(R., p.72;

pill bottle”).)

—

Maki admitted

p.147, L.3.)

The

1

district court

10-1 12; 9/23/1 9 Tr., p.26, L.22

Maki

guilty of both

to the persistent Violator allegation.

imposed a uniﬁed eight—year

ﬁxed for trafﬁcking in heroin, and six months

(R., pp.

0f the Information

— p.27,

(concurrent) for possession

L. 1 .)

Maki timely appealed.

ISSUES
Maki

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

denying Mr. Maki’s motion for a mistrial?

1.

Did the

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Maki,
a uniﬁed sentence of eight years, with three years ﬁxed following his

district court err in

conviction for trafﬁcking in heroin?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The

state rephrases the issues

on appeal

as:

1.

Has Maki

failed to

show

that the district court erred in

2.

Has Maki

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

denying his motion for a mistrial?

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Maki Has Failed T0 Show That The
A.

District

Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A Mistrial

Introduction

Maki contends that the
Delﬁco inadvertently testiﬁed
Wife, Tabatha,

was

that,

sleeping, he

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8;

law reveals

district court erred

ﬂ

by denying his motion for a mistrial

when he knocked 0n

announced “Probation

&

[sic]

6/11/19 Tn, p.203, Ls.2-3.)

Standard

Ofﬁcer

bedroom where Maki’s

Parole. Tabatha, are

you awake?”

A review of the record and applicable

that the district court correctly denied the mistrial motion.

possibility that the ofﬁcer’s testimony contributed t0

B.

the door 0f the

after

There was no reasonable

Maki’s convictions.

Of Review

The standard

for review 0f a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial is well established:

[T]he question on appeal

is

not whether the

discretion in light 0f circumstances existing

trial

judge reasonably exercised his
the mistrial motion was made.

When

must be Whether the event which precipitated the motion for
when Viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse
0f discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one
0f reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial 0f the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, Viewed retrospectively, constituted
Rather, the question

mistrial represented reversible error

reversible error.

State V. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288,

124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894

(Ct.

294

(Ct.

App. 1993));

App. 2000) (quoting State

ﬂ

also State

V.

V.

Shepherd,

Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,

389, 924 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Ct. App. 1996).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the “criminal defendant” has the burden of showing
“reversible error”

When

appealing from the denial 0f a motion for a mistrial,

163 Idaho 412, 421, 414 P.3d 234, 243 (2018), and reversible error

ﬂ

State V. Johnson,

— by deﬁnition —

is

an error

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136

that is not harmless, see State V.

(“[E]rror

not reversible unless

is

it is

shown

to

be

prejudicial.”).

Thus,

When

(Ct.

App. 2008)

a defendant appeals

a district court’s decision denying his motion for a mistrial, he has the burden of proving that the
error that precipitated the

The

C.

District

Prior t0

evidence.

motion for a mistrial was not harmless.

Court Properly Denied Maki’s Mistrial Motion

trial,

the state ﬁled a Notice of Intent t0

(R., pp.46-49.)

The

state

explained that

it

that

I.R.E. 404(b)

and I.C.R. 16(a)

intended “to introduce[] evidence that the

Defendant was 0n parole and parole/probation ofﬁcers from
at the

Use

IDOC

conducted a lawful

home

Visit

Defendant’s residence on the date 0f offenses charged.” (R., p.47.) Maki’s counsel argued

no testimony should be admitted that would allow the jury to

0r parole, for

which a prior conviction

is

infer that

Maki was 0n probation

assumed. (6/11/19 Tn, p.15, L.19 — p.16, L.13.) After

the parties’ presented argument, the district court opined in the following colloquy:

THE COURT:

I

don't care

Which word you

use, just try t0 avoid "parole."

[Deputy Prosecutor]: Okay.

THE COURT: And I guess
[Deputy Prosecutor]:

THE COURT:

comes

out,

1'11

have

t0 deal

with

it.

understand.

Hopefully, the ofﬁcer will not say that.

[Deputy Prosecutor]:
possibility that

I

if that

it

And

would be

I

explained to

sanitized.

my

ofﬁcer the 404(b) motion and the
it's difﬁcult because he is a

As you know,

parole and probation ofﬁcer for the Department 0f Corrections.

We

Will

d0 our

best.

THE COURT:

So before we

there's legal basis for the

Of course
occurred

at the

that

--

call

him, we're going t0 stipulate that the parties agree

ofﬁcer t0 be

at the

defendant's residence?

okay, and that there

residence?

was a

legal basis for the search that

[Deputy Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that

language okay?

[Defense Counsel]: That's ﬁne, Your Honor.

[Deputy Prosecutor]: That's acceptable with the
(6/11/19 Tn, p.34, L.1

During

trial,

— p.35,

State.

Thank you.

L.1.)

Ofﬁcer Delﬁco was asked What he did

after

he was allowed inside Maki’s

residence, and he answered:

room, Which Cathy had indicated where they
Their room is at the end 0f the hallway, the
last door on the left. Trenton was actually in the room next to that With Tabatha's
son. And the room — their room was actually closed With the light 0n.
Well,

were.

I

walked over

t0 their

When I — it’s down the hallway.

At that point, I just observed, I made a mental note t0 myself, that Trenton
was asleep With Tabatha's son in Tabatha's son's room right next door. And then I
knocked on their room, the room I know to be Tabatha and Trenton's room.
Knocked 0n that door. Since the light was 0n, I assumed Tabatha was awake. I got
DO anSW6r.
I

kept knocking.

I

said, "Probation

&

[sic]

Parole.

Tabatha, are you

awake?"

She
(6/1 1/19 Tr., p.202,

L.13

— p.203,

Shortly thereafter,

The witness
"Probation
to court.

Iopened the

didn't answer.

door.

L.4.)

Maki moved

for a mistrial, explaining:

explicitly said to the jury that

& [sic] Parole."

he knocked and announced, quote,

That was the whole point 0f the preliminary ruling prior

We weren't going t0 bring up

anything about probation or parole. That's

a reason for referring to the Witness as an ofﬁcer of the State of Idaho, not bringing

up anything about supervision.
(6/11/19 Tn, p.219, Ls.9-18.)

The deputy prosecutor acknowledged

the testimonial error, and

asked the court to analyze the issue in terms 0f prejudice, suggesting that the court could instruct
the jury t0 disregard the testimony.

(6/11/19 Tn, p.220, Ls.1-4.) However, both Maki’s counsel

and the court agreed

The court denied Maki’s motion

(6/1 1/19 Tn, p.220, Ls.5-16.)

I

think

would be best not

it

A11 right.

&

don't think

[sic]

to bring

it

attention to the testimony.

for a mistrial, stating:

up again.

unduly prejudicial to the defendant. Witnesses
for Department 0f Corrections. He is a
Parole ofﬁcer. So he slipped up. We do the best we can in the
I

And

are not perfect.

Probation

would draw undue

that a curative instruction

that is

it's

who he works

courtroom.

What
there

the jurors

know

is

that the

—

I

think that What they would believe is
He's — I think they would

was some kind 0f supervision 0f Mr. Maki.

reasonably believe

But

I

that.

don't think

it's

mistrial, the statement that

(6/1 1/19 Tr., p.220,

unfairly prejudicial that

would

rise t0 the level

he made. So the Court denies the motion for

0f a

mistrial.

L.15 — p.221, L5.)

The ﬂeeting mention of “Probation and Parole” by Ofﬁcer Delﬁco did not reasonably
contribute to the jury’s guilty verdicts.

“probation” 0r “parole” during the

probation or parole was
the child’s

made

trial

in front

The

errant testimony

— n0

bedroom where he saw Maki

may have

supervision

sleeping,

Every criminal
defendant

is

Tr.,

ability to

— not Maki — was

[.

.

.]

Tabatha, are you

the person targeted

by the

jury, including the

one in

this case (R., p.75), is

informed that a criminal

presumed t0 be innocent. Ajury must follow this instruction even When told of serious

informed that the

its

and Parole

hall,

p.203, Ls.2-3 (emphasis added).)

criminal accusations that the state has

that the jury

comment about Maki being 0n

and instead walked further down the

out, “Probation

indicated t0 the jury that Tabatha

(6/11/19

Visit.

other testimony 0r

the only reference to the terms

0f the jury. Further, the fact that Ofﬁcer Delﬁco by—passed

knocked 0n another bedroom door and called
awake?”,

was

was

state

made

against the defendant. In this case, the jury panel

had accused Maki 0f the serious crime 0f trafﬁcking

also accidently informed that

perform

its

in heroin.

The

was
fact

Maki was 0n either probation or parole did not alter

duty 0r to presume Maki’s innocence. In any event, there

is

n0 reasonable

probability that the

mere mention

that

Maki was on

any more signiﬁcant t0 a juror than the alleged
State V. Frederick, 126 Idaho 286, 287-289,

either probation 0r parole

details as described before

882 P.2d 453, 454-456

(Ct.

would have been

and during the

trial.

E

App. 1994) (admission 0f

unexpected mention 0f defendant’s parole status by Victim’s mother on direct examination was
harmless);

ﬂ

also State

1999) (holding that

V.

Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 729-731, 979 P.2d 128, 131-133 (Ct. App.

district court error in disclosing to

jury that the charged

DUI was

a felony

was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

The jury was

also repeatedly instructed that the state

was required

ﬁnd Maki

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt 0r else the jury must

94; 6/12/19 Tn, p.77, Ls.9-11; p.78, Ls.1-5; p.79, Ls.1-5.) There

to

not guilty.

is

n0 reason

prove the alleged
(R., pp.75, 90, 91,

t0 believe that the

jury disregarded these instructions due t0 the ﬂeeting reference t0 probation and parole. The jury

is

presumed

t0 follow the district court’s instructions.

P.3d 767, 783 (2014) (citing State

When Viewed in the
failed t0

show

V.

State V.

Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332

Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011)).

context 0f the

that the district court erred

ﬁlll record,

by denying

Maki was not
his

entitled to a mistrial.

motion for a

He

has

mistrial.

II.

Maki Has Failed To Show That The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Maki contends

that the

uniﬁed eight—year sentence with three years ﬁxed for trafﬁcking

heroin was excessive. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-1

1 .)

A review of the record, however, supports the

sentence imposed. The district court appropriately considered the relevant factors in making

sentencing determination.

Maki has

therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

10

in

its

Standard

B.

Of Review

“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.”

Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State

V.

State V. Anderson, 131

Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144

(1994)).

Maki Has Failed T0 Demonstrate That His Sentence
View Of The Facts

C.

Where
sentence

a sentence

134 Idaho 831,

that his sentence is excessive

A sentence

577, 38 P.3d at 615.

protecting society, and any 0r

retribution.

all

is

V.

is

Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)

11 P.3d

27 (2000)). To carry

facts.

burden,

Ba_lccr,

Maki must

136 Idaho

at

0f the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or

State V. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384,

582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the

that the

V.

ﬁxed portion of

sentence Where reasonable minds might

App. 1982). Maki’s sentence

differ.

fell

the sentence Will be the

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391

In deference t0 the trial judge, the Court will not substitute

(Ct.

this

reasonable if appropriate t0 achieve the primary obj ective of

defendant’s probable term 0f conﬁnement. State

(2007).

AnV Reasonable

required to establish that the

under any reasonable View of the

Whole sentence on appeal and presumes

710

Excessive Under

within statutory limits, an appellant

a clear abuse ofdiscretion. State

is

(citing State V. Lundquist,

show

is

Is

State

V.

its

View of a reasonable

Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,

well Within the statutory

maximum.

650 P.2d 707,

(m LC.

§§ 19-

25 14, 37-2732B(a)(6)(A).
In

making

its

sentencing determination in this case, the district court judge reviewed

relevant materials and acknowledged that she

to a

ﬁxed term of at

least three years.

was mandated by

(9/23/19

Tr.,

the legislature t0 sentence

p.22, Ls.6-8; p.36, Ls.22-24);

ﬂ

LC.

Maki
§ 37-

2732B(a)(6)(A) (mandatory three-years ﬁxed for trafﬁcking in heroin (two 0r more grams».

11

Therefore, the only issue before this Court
constitutes an abuse

is

whether Maki’s indeterminate term of ﬁve years

of the sentencing court’s discretion. Maki argues that the

district court

“did

not give proper consideration t0 his family support, substance abuse and desire for treatment,

mental health concerns, and remorse.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.9.)

Maki has

failed t0

show any abuse

0f the sentencing court’s discretion.
should also be noted that Maki’s ﬁve-year indeterminate term was

Initially, it

to

own

his

recommendation than the

counsel’s

recommended two

years indeterminate and the state

state’s

recommendation —

recommended 12 years

much
his

closer

counsel

(E

indeterminate.

9/23/19 Tn, p.8, Ls.15-18; p.9, Ls.8—11; p.11, Ls.18—24.)

While the support

Maki has from

that

from drug abuse or addiction,
engaging in

illegal acts.

placed in a Level

I

it

his family will certainly assist

clearly has not

him

in his recovery

been sufﬁcient in the past to prevent him from

Maki’s July 29, 2019 GAIN—I Core evaluation recommended

out—patient treatment program.

(PSI, p.13.)

that

he be

Assuming Maki’s drug addiction

constitutes a mitigating factor, his “desire for treatment” remains questionable.

Maki’s most recent

opportunities t0 address his addiction did not fare well, as the Presentence Report explained:

According t0 Ada County Jail Program staff, the defendant has not participated in
any programs While in jail. Appended information from Recovery 4 Life is a GAIN
dated November 26, 2018, recommending he participate in Level 11.1 Intensive
Outpatient Treatment and a Discharge Summary dated January 14, 2019. The
summary relayed the defendant reported a moderate motivation to engage in
treatment, he attended for the ﬁrst three weeks, then his attendance decreased, staff
were unable t0 contact him, and he was discharged for noncompliance with the
program.
(PSI, p. 1

1 .)

Maki’s past

him

did not

instill

failure t0 take

conﬁdence

advantage 0f the substance abuse treatment programs offered t0

in the district court that

12

he would d0 so in the

future.

However, the

court

was openly hopeful Maki would

incentive of having a

successfully address his addiction, especially with the

t0 father

upon release. (9/23/19 Tn,

Maki’s mental health was not a signiﬁcant mitigating factor
the presentence investigator that his mental health

in the past,

at sentencing.

was “good” and “stable.”

he reported that he had been diagnosed With anxiety,

ADHD,

— p.20,

p.19, L.18

L.6.)

He informed

(PSI, p. 1 0.)

Although

and oppositional deﬁance disorder

he had not been taking any medications for his mental health since 2016. (PSI, pp.10,

Michelle Schildhauer, a licensed clinical professional counselor with the Idaho

14-15.)

Department 0f Health and Welfare, reviewed Maki’s GAIN—I Core assessment and concluded
he “does not present With
time; therefore, there are

added).)

Assuming

SMI

[“serious mental illness”;

ﬂ

that

MH needs at this

PSI, p.25] or other

no mental health treatment recommendations.” (PSI, p.14 (explanation

the validity of the

Ms. Schildhauer’s conclusion

that

Maki does not need

mental health treatment, although not a mitigating consideration, that fact Will likely

assist

him

in

recovering from his substance abuse.

Maki’s expression of remorse and Willingness to change
Tn, p.13, L.6

Violator,

was

—

p.14, L.17.)

is

commendable.

However, his conviction for trafﬁcking

his fourth felony conviction.

(PSI, pp.4-6.2)

Maki’s criminal history and his many opportunities

The

(E 9/23/19

in heroin, as a persistent

district court

was

struck with

t0 rehabilitate, as the following colloquy

shows:

You had

a grand theft in 2013 and possession of a controlled

--

you had a

felony grand theft and a felony possession 0f controlled substance in 2013.
got seven years prison

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
2

--

Yes.

concurrent.

And then you had

it

a petit theft in 2013?

Maki’s trafﬁcking conviction was his third
listed three prior felonies for Which he had been placed on parole. (PSI, p.6.)

The Presentence Report mistakenly reported
felony, although

You

--

1

that

3

THE DEFENDANT:

Oh, the

petit theft.

am not

I

sure

I

remember What

that

was

for.

THE COURT: And apossession With intent t0 deliver in 2014.

So

it

looks like the

probation rehabilitation opportunities that you've been provided just have not

worked — have not worked on you. Would you agree with
[Defense counsel advises court that Maki
are

consulting PSI, then states there

n0 corrections]

Thank you.

A11 right.

provided on probation and

of

is

that?

that's

worked

different. But,

on parole —

for you,

anyway,

well, in the

I

So

Okay.

my

observation

is

that opportunities

at the prison, the opportunities for rehabilitation,

it

looks

like.

I

know

you're going to

tell

none

me now

it's

am looking at your history. You were released from prison

2014 grand

theft

and possession of a controlled substance

with intent to delivery, you received ﬁve years in prison. And then you were
released 0n July 18th. So you served four years in prison before being released?
(9/23/19 Tn, p.17, L.14

—

p.18, L.21 (explanation added).)

two and one-half years, and

that

Maki

said he

was

in prison for almost

he used heroin, which was readily available, during the ﬁrst year

0f his conﬁnement — although he did not know how heroin was smuggled into the prison. (9/23/ 1 9
Tn, p.20, L.23

— p.21,

Finally,

p.11.)

L.4.)

Maki’s LSI-R evaluation concluded that he was a high risk

t0 re-offend.

(PSI,

That ﬁnding alone validates that the ﬁve-year indeterminate term of his sentence was

reasonable in order t0 better insure

that,

through supervision, Maki

is

able to maintain his sobriety

and become a law-abiding and productive member of society.

Based 0n the nature 0f the offense,

his criminal history, his failure to take advantage ofpast

opportunities t0 rehabilitate, and the objectives 0f sentencing, a uniﬁed sentence 0f eight years

with three years ﬁxed

is

not excessive under any reasonable View 0f the facts of this case.

has therefore failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
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Maki

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm Maki’s convictions and sentences.

17th day of July, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day 0f July, 2020, served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File
I

and Serve:

ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

John C. McKinne

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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